| |
Mandatory
Arbitration Hits Home
by ROBERT S. BENNETT and DAVID M. MEDEARIS
Texas and federal courts provide little protection to
consumers trapped in arbitration agreements. The recent housing surge in the
Lone Star State gave rise to a number of disputes between homeowners and
homebuilders. Many homeowners learned, to their chagrin, that during the
excitement of signing the contracts for their dream homes, they may have
inadvertently signed away the constitutional right to have juries settle
complaints against the homebuilders.
Although Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code §171.022
prohibits judges from enforcing mandatory arbitration clauses when such the
agreement is determined to be unconscionable at the time the contract was
formed, there is no standard for the court to apply. Texas courts - for example
Houston's 1st Court of Appeals in Emerald Texas Inc. v. Peel (1996) - have
upheld binding arbitration clauses in homebuilder contracts where all evidence
indicates that buyer had no knowledge of real estate or even a basic
understanding of what arbitration meant. Furthermore, the Texas Supreme Court
has made it clear - in 1999's In re Oakwood Mobile Homes Inc. - that it makes no
difference if the arbitration clause is an option or a take-it-or-leave-it
adhesion contract. In the words of the court in Emerald, "public policy
favors of arbitration." In April 2001, Texas Lawyer reported an ongoing
case of Dawn Richardson, an Austin homeowner, who filed a suit against David
Weekley Homes after she learned that her family's new home allegedly was
contaminated with dangerous levels of toxic mold and volatile organic compounds
such as benzene, benzaldehyde, decane, heptane, formaldehyde, methylbenzene,
octane, styrene and xylene. [See "In Austin: Arbitration-Bound Texans Seek
Lawmakers' Help," Texas Lawyer, April 15, 2001, page 1.] As alleged, all
the family's personal belongings were ruined by the contamination, and they were
forced to evacuate after discovering the contaminants caused the family serious
health problems, including neurological damage to their baby and the death of
their family cat, which had cancer.
Recently, in Richardson v. Weekley Homes, the 53rd District
Court of Travis County ordered the Richardsons to arbitrate their dispute with
Weekley before the American Arbitration Association on the arbitration clause,
which the Richardsons alleged they did not understand when they signed the
contract with the homebuilder.
In Richardson, the homebuilder agreed to advance filing
fees and arbitration fees, but this underscores another problem with mandatory
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. Large companies often contract with
arbitration firms to handle all consumer disputes. Companies naturally tend to
use the same arbitrator repeatedly - as long as they are happy with the results
they obtain. Moreover, the secrecy of arbitration proceedings and loss of trial
and evidentiary precedent makes it difficult for consumers to go up against
arbitration regulars, such as large homebuilders. Because of the recent surge in
new home construction in Texas and the usage of mandatory arbitration clauses by
savvy homebuilders, it is likely this alternative justice will mean no justice
to many homeowners.
Despite the longstanding public policy favoring arbitration
and other forms of alternative dispute resolution, there is reason to believe
that the tides may be changing. For instance, earlier this year, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled in EEOC v. Waffle House Inc. that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission could bring suit on behalf of employees in court even
when the employer requires their employees to enter into binding arbitration
agreements as a condition for employment. Justice John Paul Stevens, speaking
for the court, noted that "[d]espite the FAA [Federal Arbitration Act]
policy favoring arbitration agreements, nothing in the FAA authorizes a court to
compel arbitration of any issues, or by any parties, that are not already
covered in the agreement." In the dissenting opinion, Justice Clarence
Thomas argued that "[b]y allowing the EEOC to pursue victim-specific relief
on behalf of [the employee] . . . the court eviscerates [the employee's]
arbitration agreement. . . ."
Several weeks after the EEOC decision, the 5th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals, interpreting Texas law, also refused to compel arbitration in
a case involving the sale of a mobile home, in which the sales contract included
a mandatory arbitration clause. In that case, Fleetwood Enters. v. Gaskamp, the
buyer's children allegedly suffered personal injuries from exposure to
formaldehyde in the new mobile home. The court held that since the children were
not parties to the contract, the parents were entitled to bring suit on behalf
of their children.
While the EEOC case and the 5th Circuit case relate to the
party bringing suit, one court suggested that another controlling factor is
whether the particular disputed issue is covered by the contract. In a 1999
Florida case, Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., brought against a homebuilder by a
homeowner whose husband allegedly was killed due to a defective air conditioning
system installed in their new home, the Florida Supreme Court refused to compel
arbitration because the court ruled that the agreement to arbitrate is not
necessarily binding on independent tort actions based upon common-law duties.
While these recent court decisions offer some hope for
consumers who unknowingly sign away their constitutional right to have juries
settle complaints, the recent decision by the 53rd District Court to compel
arbitration in Richardson highlights the need for re-examination of the policy
of allowing adhesion contracts by large corporations to deny consumers a day in
court.
On May 15, 2002, the Texas Legislature held a hearing on
binding arbitration to review the topic, "trends in the use of binding
arbitration requirements in consumer agreements, with special attention to
transactions in which the consumer has little or no bargaining power."
Consumer
groups as well as representatives of the homebuilding industry participated
full-force in the debate. However, both sides agree that as far as the Texas
homebuilding industry is concerned, mandatory arbitration is not an option for
aggrieved homebuyers - it is the rule.
One homebuilder tells homebuyers who refuse to sign his
company's arbitration clause to go elsewhere. He says they will continue this
practice, even if and when the roaring economy slows down, according to the
information in the committee packet of the Subcommittee on Binding Arbitration.
According to information received by the Subcommittee on Binding Arbitration,
several homebuilders require purchasers to enter into mandatory arbitration
agreements.
Because the FAA pre-empts state law, it is difficult for
state legislatures to do away with mandatory arbitration. However, some states
have taken positive steps to protect their consumers. For instance, California
recently enacted a law - California Code of Civil Procedure §1298.7 - that
eviscerates agreements in any claims related to bodily injury or wrongful death.
More significantly, last year, New Mexico became the first state to adopt the
Fair Bargain Act developed by Paul Carrington, a professor at Duke Law School,
according to a report submitted to the subcommittee, "Public Citizen,
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: An Opportunity for State-Level Reform."
The Fair Bargain Act, which applies to all standard form
contracts or leases, provides statutory guidance for judicial relief to have
clauses that "disable civil disputes" declared unenforceable in
certain circumstances. The act is a legislative attempt to make arbitration
fairer to consumers, and since the act applies across-the-board to form
contracts - whether they include a mandatory arbitration clause - the act is not
anti-arbitration, but pro-fair-arbitration, which is consistent with the
philosophy of the Federal Arbitration Act, and thus should survive pre-emption
challenges.
Maybe it is time for Texas to follow New Mexico's lead and
protect its consumers.
Texas Lawyer June 3, 2002
SECTION: NEWS; Vol. 17; No. 50; Pg. 21
|